Once were warriors Essay

Once were warriors Essay Once were warriors Essay Beth left her small town and despite the disapproval of her parents, married Jake "the Muss" Heke. After eighteen years they live in an unkempt State House and have five children. Their interpretations of life and being MÄ ori are tested. Their eldest daughter, Grace, keeps a journal in which she chronicles events as well as stories which she tells her younger siblings. Jake is fired from his job and is satisfied with the unemployment benefit, spending most days getting drunk at the local pub with his friends, singing songs and savagely beating any patron whom he considers to have stepped out of line. He often invites crowds of friends back from the bar to his home for drunken parties. His wife "gets lippy" at one of his parties and he brutally attacks her in front of their friends. Beth turns to drink when things go wrong, with angry outbursts and occasional violence on a much smaller scale. Her children fend for themselves, resignedly cleaning the blood-streaked house after her beating. Nig, the Heke’s eldest son, moves out to join a gang whose rituals include facial tattoos (in MÄ ori culture called TÄ  moko). This usually shows the heritage of the person; in Nig’s case, he shows only the heritage of his mother, with the Moko located on only one side of his face. He is subjected to an inititation beating by the gang members, but then embraced as a new brother and later sports the gang’s tattoos. Nig cares about his siblings, but despises his father. He is angered when his mother is beaten, but deals with it by walking away. The second son, Mark "Boogie" Heke has a history of minor criminal offences and is taken from his family and placed in a foster home as a ward of the state due to the situation with his parents. Despite his initial anger, Boogie finds a new niche for himself, as the foster home’s manager Mr. Bennett helps him embrace his MÄ ori heritage. Jake does not care that Boogie is taken away; he comments that it will do him some good, to toughen him up a bit. Beth is heartbroken, and scrapes money together to visit him. Jake pays for the rental car from gambling winnings, but deserts the family to go to the pub and they never make the journey. Grace, the Heke’s 13-year-old daughter, loves writing stories. Her best friend is a homeless boy named Toot who lives in a wrecked car. She despises the future she believes is inevitable and is constantly reminded of getting married and playing the role of the wife, which she believes is catering to one’s husband’s demands and taking beatings. She dreams of leaving and being independent and single. Grace is raped in her bed by her father’s friend "Uncle Bully" who tells her that it is her fault for "turning him on" by wearing her "skimpy little nighty". She becomes depressed. She tries to go to her friend Toot for support, smoking her first dope. Toot kisses her, but she reacts violently and storms out, believing him to be "just like the rest of them". After wandering through the city streets, Grace comes home to an angry Jake with his friends. Bully asks for a goodnight kiss in

Answering the US Census Is Required by Law

Answering the US Census Is Required by Law Many people consider the questions from the  U.S. Census Bureau  either too time-consuming or too invasive and fail to respond. But responding to all census questionnaires is required by federal law. While it rarely happens, the Census Bureau can impose fines for failing to answer the census or the American Community Survey or for intentionally providing false information. According to Title 13, Section 221 (Census, Refusal or neglect to answer questions; false answers) of the United States Code, persons who fail or refuse to respond to the mail-back census form, or refuse to respond to a follow-up census taker, could be fined up to $100. Persons who knowingly provided false information to the census can be fined up to $500. But those fines have significantly increased as of 1984. The Census Bureau points out that under  Section 3571 of Title 18, the fine for refusing to answer a bureau survey can be as much as $5,000, and up to $10,000 for knowingly providing false information. Before imposing a fine, the Census Bureau typically attempts to personally contact and interview persons who fail to respond to census questionnaires. Follow-up Visits In the months following each census- which occurs every 10 years- more than 1.5 million census takers make door-to-door visits to all households that failed to respond to mail-back census questionnaires. The Census worker will assist a member of the household- who must be at least 15-years old- in completing the census survey form. Census workers can be identified by a badge and Census Bureau bag. Privacy Persons concerned about  the privacy of their answers should know that, under federal law, all employees and officials of the Census Bureau are prohibited from sharing a persons personal information with anyone else, including welfare agencies, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Internal Revenue Service, courts, police, and the military. Violation of this law carries penalties of $5,000 in fines and up to five years in prison. American Communities Survey Unlike the census, which is conducted every 10 years (as required by Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution), the American Communities Survey (ACS) is now sent annually to more than 3 million U.S. households. Those selected to participate in the ACS first receive a letter in the mail stating, â€Å"In a few days you will receive an American Community Survey questionnaire in the mail.† The letter will go on to state, â€Å"Because you are living in the United States, you are required by law to respond to this survey.† The envelope will boldly remind you that, â€Å"Your response is required by law.† The information requested by the ACS is more extensive and detailed than  the handful of questions on the regular decennial census. The information gathered in the annual ACS focuses mainly on population and housing and is used to update the information gathered by the decennial census. Federal, state and community planners and policymakers find the more recently updated data provided by the ACS more helpful than the often 10-year-old data from the decennial census. The ACS survey includes about 50 questions applying to each person in the household and takes about 40 minutes to complete, according to the Census Bureau, which states: â€Å"Estimates from the ACS contribute to providing an important picture of America, and an accurate response to the ACS questionnaire is important. When used in conjunction with the most recently available decennial census counts, information from the ACS documents how we live as a nation, including our education, housing, jobs, and many other issues.† Online Census While the Government Accountability Office has questioned the cost, the Census Bureau is expected to offer an online response option for the 2020 decennial census. Under this option, people could respond to their census questionnaires by visiting a secure  website. Census officials hope the convenience of the online response option will increase the census response rate, and thus the accuracy of the census. Purpose The census is used to apportion members of the U.S. House of Representatives and for allocating funds for programs to help the needy, elderly, veterans, and more. The statistics also might be used by local governments to decide where infrastructure projects are needed.

Employment law paper Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Employment law paper - Essay Example This is simply because any act of a supervisor can be construed to be the act of an employer, especially when an employee is impacted on a job benefit. In cases where the employee is not impacted in tangible terms, here the employers can limit the liability under the following defense: a) The employer has been noted to exercise reasonable care for the prevention of any form of harassment, and b) The employee has not taken complete advantage of any preventive measures that have been provided by the employers. The EEOC General Counsel explains that the cases that involve the English only rule or any restrictive language policies and any language discrimination are given first importance for the commission. As per the EEOC, employers cannot and must not target the workers based on discrimination based on fears, stereotypes or even fear of the language or country of origin. Based on the Title VII, Sears has clearly violated the law, as it clearly explains, no employment discrimination based on any factor like race, age, color, sex, national origin or even religion is allowed. In this case Mary has been fired from the company for speaking in Spanish on the sales floor with a co-worker. This is clearly a violation of the law and clearly shows discrimination against the employees. The fact that the employees are allowed to talk in Spanish with the customers however not with the coworkers, is a clear discrimination. Mary could have been given a warning however, not fired as it is not ethical an d completely violates the Title VII and the EEOC rules. The Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications allows the employers to make discrimination and permits them to employers of American Airlines to discriminate and to make the pilots and flight attendants to work on religious holidays as well. This however is not fair and it is important to understand, when companies prefer to have a diversified work force, it is

600 ML pepsi Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

600 ML pepsi - Essay Example He introduced it as Brad’s Drink and later renamed it Pepsi after enzyme Pepsin and the kola nuts ingredients (Stoddard, 1997). Pepsi, introduced as a cough syrup in America, sold in the pharmacies. Everyone liked the taste of the syrup. In 1909, Pepsi was licensed to process, bottle and trade in more than 24 states in the United States. It introduced its products in a 6.5 ounce bottle. Endorsement of the original application for Pepsi trademark took place in 1903 after an application in 1902 (Stoddard, 1997). Pepsi gained recognition in 1936 after the introduction of the 12 ounce bottle during the great depression. In 1950, there were slight changes in the Pepsi cola formula and calories and sweetness were also slightly altered in Pepsi cola. In 1957, the marketing team changed the bottle appearance of Pepsi cola to a new and attractive bottle and introduced new products, i.e. Mirinda and Teem. Currently, Pepsi cola is available in each and every country and is available to more than hundred million consumers in Asia as well as Africa and Europe (Stoddard, 1997). Distribution of Pepsi products in Abu Dhabi is indirect. Through the capital of the United Arab Emirates, Pepsi has a market share of 67 percent while Coca cola has a market share of 35 percent (Louis & Yazijian, 1980). This data fluctuates with periods and most of the times Pepsi is at par with coca cola, the biggest competitor. Pepsi dominates Abu Dhabi’s soft drink market. According to Harrell (2008), marketing environment refers to the forces and factors that influence a company’s aptitude to create and sustain healthy and successful relationships with customers. Marketing environment consists of the macro environment and the micro environment. The microenvironment refers to the factors and forces that are close to the company and influence the way the company serves its customers. This includes the suppliers, marketing intermediaries, customer markets and the competitors.

Shutter Island Essay Example for Free

Shutter Island Essay This movie was confusing from the beginning, Edward Teddy Daniels a previous World War II veteran whom suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome and constantly has flashbacks. Shutter Island follows U.S. Marshall Daniels and his partners Chuck Aule while the investigate the disappearance mental patient from Ashecliffe Hospital for the Criminal Insane. Teddy requested the assignment for personal reasons. But he wonders was he hasn’t been brought to the island and conspiracy. Fire is an symbol for Teddy whole existence every time Teddy is around (ex. The matches he lights in Ward C) the fire in the cave with Dr. Solando and when he starts an fire and blows up Dr. Crawley’s car. He constantly played with fire that burnt down his own apartment killing four people one of which was his own wife Dolores Chanal. He has produced this whole conspiracy theory that somehow the government has begun doing experimental testing on patients at the asylum. In reality Teddy has been declared insane and was sent to Shutters Island. Upon arriving at the institution. Teddy is the subject of the experiment; the doctors attempt to have Teddy regain his life back. Dr. Crawley and Dr. Sheehan began implanting false memories into Teddy’s mind. Teddy is delusional claims that he is an U.S. Marshall to justify his own presence. Dr. Crawley who invented Racheal Solando for him to discover what happen to the 67 patient which is actually Edward (Teddy) Daniels. Teddy’s partner who is really Dr. Sheehan is in on the experiment he tries to steer Teddy in right direction. He encourages Teddy to continue the hunt he tries to push fear on Teddy by even taking him to an Mausoleum. And he is always playing with Teddy whether its real or delusional He even gives Teddy an admission form that says it’s really 67 patients at the asylum so Teddy’s Feel that he has to find Racheal whom is supposedly escaped which she really turns out to be a nurse whom has treated Teddy while he has been a patient at Ashecliffe Hospital. While on the hunt for the missing patient Teddy encounters different obstacles. Dr. Crawley and Dr. Sheehan are is slowly taking Teddy off his meds so he starting to feel body tremors and withdrawals. Sheehan and Crawley began to monitor his doses for the role playing experiment in the film Teddy begins to have more vivid hallucinations while he’s awake his meds are meant to suppress all types of psychosis not to trigger more going off the meds make Teddy really unsteady. When Teddy reaches the lighthouse he is confused and is starting to second guess everything that he has been going through. He has developed his own explanation. Though it was an complete delusional fantasy. At this point the experiment is judged to have failed or succeeded , If Teddy accepts this fabricated account that the Drs. Have succeeded in attempting to implant a false memory. Teddy has been through this before and realizes that there is no way out Shutter Island Teddy struggles with being Lobotomize but reconsiders and decides that lobotomy would be better than chasing Andrew Laeddis for the rest of his life he figure they’ll just try to keep forcing the Lake House, Racheal Solando, and the other delusions he was having over and over again. Teddy made the choice to take the lobotomy and thus die a good man. â€Å"It is better to live as a monster or die a good man†. He refuses to accept the reality that he was just a an maintenance man who love to play with fire whose wife died because of this, and is stuck in a delusion in which he is Teddy Daniels an U.S. Marshall hunting down a suspected killer Andrew Laeddis an false identity other than a man that killed his wife. Throughout the entire movie the audience is caught up in the Teddy story thinking that he is actually sent to the island to find a suspected escapee. Even his flashbacks trigger the watcher to think Teddy has really had a hard life losing his children, killing his beloved wife whom the audience thought she actually killed the children which causing Teddy is become an alcoholic. Unbeknown to the watcher Teddy is playing the role of a functioning adult whose is trying desperately trying to figure up what is really happening on Shutter Island. The Drs. are trying so hard to get a major breakthrough with medicine by giving the opportunity to reenact his own fabricated story. The viewer is rooting for Teddy only to realize he is leading them a on wild goose hunt because in fact he is insane and can’t grasp the concept on reality what’s real, fake, makeup, or just plain lunacy. One question are there two possible endings were Teddy and Andrew possibly real was Teddy really married was a government it coverup did Teddy knows too much about the Nazis and espionage? This moving was scaring at the same time interesting because it is an movie one would possibly have to see more than once to get an complete understanding.

The Causes and Consequences of the Russian Crisis of 1998 Essay

The causes and consequences of the Russian crisis of 1998 The period 1995 to mid-1997 was boom time for Russia’s financial markets. The value of the Russian bonds and stocks soared, with the participation of foreigners in these asset markets increasing rapidly. International investors’ optimism about the country’s future was lifted by stabilization policy that followed the advice of Western institutions. Russian crisis of 1998 were caused due to a number of factors, the investor risk aversion by foreign players, fall in oil prices put the ruble under a drastic downward trend. Russia at that point in time was heavily dependent on capital inflows which was eroded due to the external shocks e.g Asian financial crisis etc country stabilization program crumbled immediately due such triggers. The government at that time protected the exchange rate mechanism and the ruble, they took measures by reducing the supply of money which lead to drastic change in the interest rates.Turbulent change in the government where administration tried to stabilize the economy through drastic fiscal tightening and fresh foreign borrowings. These were drastically desperate measures they had taken which lead to volatility and instability in financial markets. The initial surge in bond and stock prices in 1995–97 owed to a highly ambitious monetary stabilization program, which compressed inflation much faster than other transition economies. Due to high dollarization, disinflation was based on the exchange rate. The program produced rapid real appreciation and a persistent need for capital inflows, while weak economic structures and lack of domestic political support prevented accompanying fiscal consolidation and foreign direct investment. The ga... ...tzer, and Brian Pinto. 2005. â€Å"Sargent–Wallace Meets Krugman–Flood–Garber, Or: Why Sovereign Debt Swaps Don't Avert Macroeconomic Crises.† Economic Journal 115:343–67 †¢ Gaddy, Clifford G., and Barry W. Ickes. 1998. â€Å"Russia's Virtual Economy.† Foreign Affairs 77(5):53–67 †¢ Government of the Russian Federation (2001a), Federal Government 2001 Borrowing Plan, Available http://www.akm.ru †¢ Astapovich, A., E. Gavrilenkov, L. Grigoryev, T. Maleva, A. Poletaev and S. Vasiliev (2000), ‘Overview of Economic Policy in Russia in 1999’, Bureau of Economic Analysis †¢ IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2000b. Debt- and Reserve-Related Indicators of External Vulnerability. March 23, 2000. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/debtres/debtres.pdf †¢ Government of The Russian Federation. 1998b. â€Å"Stabilization of the Economy and Finance Program.† June 19, 1998 The Causes and Consequences of the Russian Crisis of 1998 Essay The causes and consequences of the Russian crisis of 1998 The period 1995 to mid-1997 was boom time for Russia’s financial markets. The value of the Russian bonds and stocks soared, with the participation of foreigners in these asset markets increasing rapidly. International investors’ optimism about the country’s future was lifted by stabilization policy that followed the advice of Western institutions. Russian crisis of 1998 were caused due to a number of factors, the investor risk aversion by foreign players, fall in oil prices put the ruble under a drastic downward trend. Russia at that point in time was heavily dependent on capital inflows which was eroded due to the external shocks e.g Asian financial crisis etc country stabilization program crumbled immediately due such triggers. The government at that time protected the exchange rate mechanism and the ruble, they took measures by reducing the supply of money which lead to drastic change in the interest rates.Turbulent change in the government where administration tried to stabilize the economy through drastic fiscal tightening and fresh foreign borrowings. These were drastically desperate measures they had taken which lead to volatility and instability in financial markets. The initial surge in bond and stock prices in 1995–97 owed to a highly ambitious monetary stabilization program, which compressed inflation much faster than other transition economies. Due to high dollarization, disinflation was based on the exchange rate. The program produced rapid real appreciation and a persistent need for capital inflows, while weak economic structures and lack of domestic political support prevented accompanying fiscal consolidation and foreign direct investment. The ga... ...tzer, and Brian Pinto. 2005. â€Å"Sargent–Wallace Meets Krugman–Flood–Garber, Or: Why Sovereign Debt Swaps Don't Avert Macroeconomic Crises.† Economic Journal 115:343–67 †¢ Gaddy, Clifford G., and Barry W. Ickes. 1998. â€Å"Russia's Virtual Economy.† Foreign Affairs 77(5):53–67 †¢ Government of the Russian Federation (2001a), Federal Government 2001 Borrowing Plan, Available http://www.akm.ru †¢ Astapovich, A., E. Gavrilenkov, L. Grigoryev, T. Maleva, A. Poletaev and S. Vasiliev (2000), ‘Overview of Economic Policy in Russia in 1999’, Bureau of Economic Analysis †¢ IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2000b. Debt- and Reserve-Related Indicators of External Vulnerability. March 23, 2000. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/debtres/debtres.pdf †¢ Government of The Russian Federation. 1998b. â€Å"Stabilization of the Economy and Finance Program.† June 19, 1998

Facebook’s Initial Public Offering

The reasons for Facebook to go public In the beginning, Facebook, through its founder Mark Zuckerberg, was unwilling to go public and refused a number of buyout offers. However, it reached the 500 threshold after accepting private investments from firms, which eventually made Zuckerberg decide to go public. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires that private companies reaching more than 500 ‘shareholders of record’ must abide by the same requirements of financial disclosure undertaken by public companies (Sloan, 2012). It is clear that Facebook’s decision to go public through an initial public offering (IPO) was not the same as the common reasons of firms when they undertake the same decision, which is to draw more revenues (Palmiter, 2008). However, in the long run, Facebook also aimed to access external financing as a result of IPO (Sloan, 2012). The reasons for companies to go public beyond their need for more money are enhanced financial condition, ability to cash out, improved corporate reputation, and improved opportunity for future acquisition (Peng, 2012). The dollar objective of every company in relation to the amount expected to be raised via IPO The dollar objectives of companies entering IPOs for increased revenue purposes are to develop reserves and increase external funds (Vedavalli, 2007; Sullivan, 2007), access capital (Dana, 2004; Ernst and Hacker, 2012), improve financial condition, increase shareholder value, and improve capital to sustain growth (Ernst and Hacker, 2012). In Facebook’s case, its stock price dwindled as there were concerns about its overpriced IPO and long-term business outlook and lost around $ 25 billion in value (Kuratko, 2012). The expected use of the money raised by IPO One expected use of the money raised by IPO is retiring from debt, in which, it is necessary to pay close attention to the company’s financial data and overall growth prospects. Another is enjoyment of the proceeds by the owners of the shares, especially for the sale of secondary shares. Moreover, sold primary shares (newly created shares) from an IPO increase revenue to the companies’ accounts (Khurshed, 2011). In the case of Facebook, the company raised a large amount of money, which has amounted to $ 18 billion. In actuality, there was no increase in the number of shares it sold to the public; instead, most of the new shares were from Zuckerberg, and such was considered not a good sign (Khurshed, 2011). References Dana, L. (2004) Handbook of research on international entrepreneurship. Glos, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. Ernst, D. and Hacker, J. (2012). Applied international corporate finance. Berlin: Verlag Franz Vahlen GmbH. Khurshed, A. (2011). Initial public offerings: The mechanics and performance of IPOs. First Edition. Hampshire: Harriman House Ltd. Kuratko, D. F. (2012) Entrepreneurship: Theory, process, practice. NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Peng, M. W. (2012). Global strategy. Mason, OH: Cengage Learning. Sloan, P. (2012). Three reasons Facebook has to go public. Retrieved on December 3, 2013 from http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57368449-93/three-reasons-facebook-has-to-go-public/ Sullivan, L. R. (2007). Historical dictionary of the People’s Republic of China. Maryland: A Scarecrow Press, Inc. Vedavalli, R. (2007). Energy for development: Twenty-first century challenges of reform and liberalization in developing countries. London: Anthem Press.

Ntt Docomo

NTT DoCoMo i-mode:value innovation at DoCoMo. (2003). Recuperado de la base de datos de UESAN (031397) 16088 INSEADBlue Ocean Strategy lnstitute The Business School for the World18 BOS005 NTT DoCoMo i-mode TM: Value lnnovation at DoCoMo 08/2009-5079 This is a modified version of the original case ‘NTI' DoCoMo i-mode'l'M: Creating a Solution for the Masses' (number 05/2002-5036), written by Yasushi Shiina, INSEAD MBA 2000. Jason Hunter preparad this freely adapted version, under the supervision of Professors W. Chan Kim, Renee Mauborgne and Ben M. Bensaou.It is intended to be used as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrativa situation. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC i-modeTM is a registered trademark of NT1†² DoCoMo, Inc. in Japan. TO ORDER COPIES OF INSEAD CASES, 5EE DETA! Ul ON ‘! ‘HE BACK COVER. COPIES MAY NOT BE MADE WITHOUT PERMISSION. Every ten years, Japanese companies come up with a new mobile device that shakes the world. Sony's Walkman was launched in 1979 and Nintendo launched Gameboy in 1989. And in 1999, we invented i-mode.I Mari Matsunaga Kouji Ohboshi is a worried man. It's early 1999, and NTT DoCoMo's Chairman is anxiously waiting to hear how the press conference for i-mode- bis company's new mobile Internet system – has fared. He has every reason to be nervous. Although DoCoMo is a leader in the Japanese mobile industry, the market is showing signs of saturation and Ohboshi has gambled a large stake of bis company's future on the development of the new system. The report arrives and bis worst fears are realized: the press conference was a debacle.The launch of i-mode couldn't have gone worse. With only seven reporters attending, i ­ mode's extravagant debut had fallen on deaf ears. Those journalists present were among Japan's least charitable. With the Internet boom waning, reporters were more skeptical than ever. Mobile Internet services ha d failed elsewhere so why should they work in Japan? Why not wait, like everyone else, for the third generation (30) global wireless Internet protocol? Ohboshi knew that unfavorable or- worse – weak press coverage in Japan's trend-driven mobile phone market could spell disaster.Had he made the wrong decision to shift the company's strategic focus? Were bis skeptical colleagues at DoCoMo right? What Ohboshi didn't know at the time was that in the weeks to come, i-mode would become an explosive success. Like the Walkman and Gameboy that preceded it, i-mode was to be more than simply a commercial success – it became a phenomenon. What explains this amazing success in Japan? How did DoCoMo turn a highly competitive industry with declining growth potential into an attractive business opportunity? NTT DoCoMo's Trouhled BirthNTT DoCoMo was formed in 1992 as part of a partial govemment break-up of the powerful Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) telecom monopoly. Formerly NTT 's mobile phone unit, it was cast from the nest to take over wireless communications sales and operations as an independent enterprise. Kouji Ohboshi, an energetic 60-year-old, was the first CEO of a company whose name DoCoMo is both a play on the Japanese word for â€Å"anywhere† and an abbreviation of ‘Do Communications over the Mobile network. ‘ Interview: Ms. Mari Matsunaga, formerly Manager, Gateway Business Dept. NTT DoCoMo (20 Aug. 2001). Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 08/2009-5079 Blue Ocean Strategy Institute From the start, Ohboshi realized that DoCoMo had a tough road ahead. The mobile phone market was over-regulated, transmission quality was poor, subscription fees were costly and mobiles were heavy. 2 Moreover, there was a palpable sense that the market had reached a plateau (Exhibit 1). 3 Japan's economic bubble had burst and businesses had cut back mobile phone purchases.To add insult to injury, tough new govemment rules forbade the fledgling DoCoMo to ask NTT for financial assistance. By the end of its frrst year DoCoMo was saddled with a â€Å"1O billion yen loss †¦ and bankruptcy was a serious threat. â€Å"4 Paced with a looming crisis, Ohboshi went for broke, setting out to expand the market by bringing cellular phones to the masses. And he did so with a vengeance. During the next two years, Ohboshi invested 50 billion – a large sum for a company making a loss – to bring DoCoMo's mobile network services to everyday users. 5 His first move was to improve DoCoMo's network.In 1993 the company 1aunched its new revo1utionary PDC (Personal Digital Cellular) standard, bringing crystal clear calls, fewer interruptions and less background noise. Moreover, PDC helped DoCoMo use its limited allocation of radio spectrum more efficiently. Within a few months DoCoMo's PDC standard was adopted by competitor carriers across Japan. By December 1998, it would account for 98. 7% of the Japanese market. (Exhibit 4)6 Next DoCoMo slashed prices. lts high deposit was abolished in October 1993 and subscription fees were cut in 1996.By March 1999 monthly basic charges had dropped 73%, the average charge for a three-minute call on DoCoMo falling 57. 6% in the same period. Once again, the rest ofthe industry quickly followed suit by cutting fees (Exhibit 3). The lust for market share in the mid-90s drove carriers to continue slashing prices to rock bottom levels, even as monthly average revenue per user (ARPU) continued to sink (while monthly average minutes use remained relatively stable). (Exhibit 5) Ohboshi also attracted new customers by reducing the size of the phones.NTT had one of the largest R;D teams in the telecom industry and DoCoMo maintained close relationships with 2 Matsunaga (2000}, i-mode jiken (i-mode: The Birth of i-mode), Kadokawa Shoten. 3The frrst Japanese cellular phone service was launched in December 1979. It was a disaster. The high service fees made the telephones unaffordable t o all but the wealthiest of businessmen (sa/arimen). After putting down 200,000 deposit and a 72,000 subscription fee, users would hand over another 26,000 in monthly fees anda call charge of 280 for every three minutes.Moreover, the service area was limited, the sound quality was inferior to pay phones, and you had to be physically fit: first generation cellular phones weighed 3kg and were carried over the shoulder. With the stimulation of government deregulation and subsequent technological innovations it took a full 1O years before cell phones became increasingly attractive to mass consumers. Carriers and telecom equipment manufacturers worked closely to improve both the usability of the phones and the quality of transrnission. Rightly, they believed that reducing the size of handsets and extending their battery life were crucial improvements.By the end of 1998, the weight and the battery life of a standard phone reached 68g and 330 hours respectively (Exhibits 2 and 3). 4 Interv iew: Mr. Kouji Ohboshi, Chairman, NTT DoCoMo 5 Ohboshi (2000): DoCoMo kyuseicho no keiei (DoCoMo: Management ofrapid growth), Diamond Sha 6 Tadashi Aoyagi (2000): Daisansedai keitai business: nichibeiou no nerai (The third generation cellular phone business: Aims of Japan, US and Europe}, Ric Telecom (exhibit 19) Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 2 08/2009-5079 elecom equipment manufacturers. 7 Ohboshi leaned heavily on DoCoMo's engineers and its suppliers to reduce the size of phones and extend their battery life. Although DoCoMo was feeling the effects of deregulation, it made the best of the gains offered by the new competitive environment. Within ayear of Ohboshi's drastic measures, DoCoMo was still Japan's largest mobile telephone carrier, and its revenues and net income had soared. 8 By March 1999, DoCoMo's sales revenue ballooned to ;v;3,118 billion with a net income of;v;205 billion, and market capitalization topping out at ;v;11. trillion- about 60% of the size ofits parent co mpany, NTT. (Exhibit 8) The Wud, Wb'eless East NTT DoCoMo's emergence, together with deregulation, technological innovation, price reduction and the launch of new services all contributed to the rapid expansion of the mobile phone market to mass users in Japan. In a 10-month period during 1998, the market grew by an estimated 8 million users, bringing the total number of subscribers to 39. 8 million in January 1999- fulfilling 87. 2% of Japan's total wireless market. (Exhibit 1)9 Competition for market share in the late 1990s was cut-throat.Deregulation continued apace and by 1998 a flood of large foreign carriers and equipment manufacturers had entered the fast-growing market as the government lifted the last remaining limitations on foreign investment (Exhibit 4). 10 Competition was equally fierce in the drive to offer new services. J ­ Phone shrewdly targeted younger users, launching the first SMS (short message service) and information services via the J-Sky Web package. Using a similar approach, DoCoMo introduced the wildly successful ‘Pocket Board,' a well-designed yet inexpensive mobile with email and game functions. 1 By January 1999, the wireless market in Japan had experienced seven years of rapid expansion (Exhibit 1), with every third person owning a mobile phone. Although the size of the market was still small compared to that of fixed lines, its annua1 average growth rate of 7 DoCoMo inherited from NTI c1ose re1ationships with four 1arge Japanese suppliers (NEC, Fujitsu, Matsushita Communications Panasonic and Mitsubishi Electronics), who worked closely with NTI DoCoMo to break through technological barriers.This network soon became known as the ‘DoCoMo Family', since its products were sold under the NIT DoCoMo brand, and the only way to identify the manufacturer of a cellular phone was to look at the first letter of the product number (e. g. , ‘N' for NEC). These relationships gave NTI DoCoMo considerable advantage especially once its PDC standard was accepted as the only one in Japan. 8 It rernained the nation's leading carrier; however, at times DoCoMo's market share dropped below 50% due to fierce competition. The growth in subscribers was attributed to the increase in personal users. However, churn rates (subscriber termination rates) were also increasing, showing that customer loyalty was vulnerable in the new environment. 10 Airtouch acquired a 10-15% stake in the J-Phone Group of companies and offered its technical expertise; Motorola, a US electronic products manufacturer invested in the Tuka Group of companies. 11 For their part, DDI Cellular and IDO improved the quality of transmission substantially by adopting the US-based cdmaOne digital protocol.Although these services attracted new customers, these numbers were not significant enough to boost growth or change the structure of the market. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 3 08/2009-5079 —–y- Blue Ocean Strategy Institute 68% was a stounding compared to the anemic growth (1. 5%) of the ftxed line market. Yet despite general optimism in the market, Ohboshi was once again getting nervous. .A. fter Victory, Tighten your Helmet StrapHis marketing background had taught him that, â€Å"fast growth means fast maturity, and faster speed for the market to move from maturity to saturation and then to decline†. 12 The market was once again moving to saturation both in the number of potential new users and in capacity as available radio bandwidth increasingly limited market expansion. lt was time for action. To survive, Ohboshi believed that DoCoMo needed â€Å"to create a new market, not by adapting to changes but by creating the changes through positively transforming their corporate strategy†. 3 Ohboshi told his employees that DoCoMo had to shift from simply increasing the size of the voice-based wireless market, to creating new value for customers. Shortly afterwards, in July 1996, the company formerly a nnounced its new strategic focus: ‘from volume to value. ‘ Volume to Value At the heart of Ohboshi's â€Å"Volume to Value† focus was non-voice-based wireless data transmission. With the explosion of Internet use during the late 1990s (Exhibit 6), DoCoMo realized that the use of e-mail and the web was quickly becoming a cornerstone of everyday life.From new market and social psychology research, Ohboshi was convinced that, â€Å"the daily needs and wants of the people in a mature society like Japan would shift from physical goods to communication, information, knowledge and entertainment†. 14 Not only did the Internet offer new opportunities for ftlling customer demand, it also solved one of Ohboshi's greatest concerns: an increasingly congested radio spectrum. In contrast to traditional voice conversations that are sent via dedicated spectrum airwaves, Internet traffic is dispersed in small packets across the network to be eassembled at their destination ( e. g. , a user's telephone). IfDoCoMo created an alternative mobile Internet network based on packet ­ switching technologies, it would completely circumvent the burdened voice network. Within a year, DoCoMo was building one of Japan's ftrst nationwide packet-switching networks. 15 The mobile computing team was strengthened and soon new products and 12 Ohboshi (2000) 13 lbid. 14 Interview: Mr. Kouji Ohboshi, Chairman, NTT DoCoMo 15 This system wou1d not on1y ease the use of congested radio spectrum capacity, but a1so serve as the basis for 3G services.Despite the optimistic market expectation and technological developments, the prospects for the 3G technologies were not necessarily bright. Although similar new data communication services attracted customers (e. g. , WAP services in Europe), they had not proved to be adequate enough to boost the market, and it was feared that the same might be true of 3G cellular services. The introduction of new 3G technologies would also create h uge additional costs for carriers, which had already incurred more than l trillion yen capital expenditure over the past few years (Exhibit 7).Furthermore, competition would increase as other intemational carriers competed in a single global market. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 4 08/2009-5079 services were introduced- albeit not very successfully- culminating in 1997 with the  · 10 e ­ mail service' (customers could send and receive 2 kilobytes of data for a mere 10). 16 Although these early Internet initiatives were not big profit-makers for NTT DoCoMo, they created a new market by attracting customers who had never used cellular phones or e-mail before.As one of the team members involved in developing mobile computing services pointed out, â€Å"Our intention was not to develop and introduce new products into the market, but to create and introduce new ways ofusing our traditional wireless services. â€Å"17 The New Wireless World In January 1997, Ohboshi asked Keiichi Eno ki, a former electrical engineer and DoCoMo's new Director of Corporate Sales, to plan and launch a new mobile data communication service for the mass market embodying his †volume to value† strategy. 8 He later reflected: About ayear after we started launching new mobile data communication services, revenues from such new services increased to constitute 5o/'o-6% of our total revenues. With detailed marketing research and advice from externa/ consultants, 1 felt a need to further boost these new services and asked Enoki, whom 1trusted, to head a project speciflcally targeting the mass market. 1 assured him that he would have full discretion in choosing his staff and in using funds worth 5 billion yen, which is a lot of money. 9 Enoki would have his work cut out for him. DoCoMo had a new strategic focus, but after two long years Ohboshi's team had yet to match vision with performance. Enoki had to create a winner. He was tasked to develop a mobile phone service that would advance the Internet in the same way the Sony Walkman had advanced the stereo. But how? â€Å"I got the first hints from my family,† recalls Enoki. â€Å"At that time, the pager was at the peak ofits popularity. My daughter used the number pad as a form of data communication.My son could play a new computer game without reading the instructions. Their ability to adapt to 16 In addition to these measures, Ohboshi and his successor Keiji Tachikawa, (then Vice-President}, set up a small project team within the Corporate Strategy Planning Department, and very soon the first proposal for NTT DoCoMo's ‘Vision 2010' was drafted. The year 2010 was deliberately chosen as ‘it will be the time when wireless telecom technologies will make nnovations from 30 to 40 and also the period of 10 years is the longest possible for reasonable predictions to be rnade in a fast-changing environment' ‘Vision 2010' forecast huge opportunities for mobile telecom services in enrichin g personal lives and in supporting global corporate activities. In particular, it saw a greater role for mobile data services in fulfilling the needs of women, senior citizens and medica! systems, important to a society characterized by a lower birth rate and an aging population.In addition to these market projections, it also emphasized the need for DoCoMo to cooperate with other companies to expand the wireless telecom market, and summarized DoCoMo's operations towards the year 2010 in five key concepts or ‘MAGIC' for short (Exhibit 9). 17 Interview: Mr. lrukayama, Mobile Multimedia Business Department, NTT DoCoMo. 18 Ohboshi (2000). 19 Interview: Mr. Kouji Ohboshi, Chairman, NTT DoCoMo. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 5 08/2009-5079 ew information technology and its ease of use convinced me that young people would accept a new data service that would give them the same kind of enjoyment. â€Å"20 Now a believer, Enoki set out to tackle the new initiative by doing the unthink able: recruiting new blood from the outside to lead the project. He first called Mari Matsunaga, a senior executive at Recruit Co. , a job placement fmn. Matsunaga was known for her marketing prowess and dramatic turnaround of Recruit's job placement magazine for women into one of Japan's hottest titles. She would head the content development team for DoCoMo's new service.Enoki then sought out a manager to devise a business model for the new mobile data communication service. He chose Takeshi Natsuno, a Wharton MBA and former head of Hypernet, one of Japan's frrst (and most hyped) net startups. 21 Developing the Electronic Concierge service Mastunaga set out to understand how the Internet works. What were the killer applications that provided web users with superior value? In studying the winners – such as AOL (America Online)- she found a positive correlation between the number oflnternet users and the volume of content. As content increased, so did the number of users and v ice versa. 2 Hence her conclusion: ‘Content would have to be king on the new DoCoMo system. ‘ She also recognized that simply putting ‘information' on the network would not differentiate the new service from the existing PC-based Internet, nor would it add value to users who were often lost in the sea of information on the web. Matsunaga thus envisioned a service that would function like a ‘hotel concierge', where users would be ‘serviced' by content providers. If DoCoMo could make it possible for users to access pre-selected websites on the screen of their handset, then they would capture Mastunaga's concept of an E/ectronic Concierge.The team set out to create such a user-friendly portal (Exhibit 10) to serve both asan accreditation of quality for those pre-selected â€Å"official† sites, as well as an easy way to navigate the whole wireless web – similar to the service AOL provides its customers (Exhibit 11). Users could access other â €Å"non-official† sites simply by typing in the URL address. Meanwhile, Natsuno devised a business model for the new mobile data communication service based on what he saw as the â€Å"Internet worldview† rather than the â€Å"telecom worldview†. 3 The telecom worldview, according to Natsuno, is a zero-sum approach: carriers determine the standards and the services that can ride on their network, and are not interested in adapting to others' technology or in sharing profits with other players in the value chain. Users must accept the infrastructure and services carriers offer them. Conversely, the â€Å"Internet worldview† is a positive-sum approach. As the Internet is an open network that can be accessed with various devices (e. g. , computers, PDAs) whose 0 ‘A discussion with Keiichi Enoki, Senior Vice President, General Manager of Gateway Business Department, Mobile Multimedia Division' in NTT DoCoMo Annua1 Report 2000. 21 By the time he joined D oCoMo, Natsuno had already left Hypemet before the free ISP fell from glory in a multi-billion yen crash in 1997. 22 Interview: Mr. Kazuhiro Takagi, Director, Gateway Business Department, NTT DoCoMo. 23 Takeshi Natsuno (2000), i-modeâ„ ¢ strategy (i-modeâ„ ¢ strategy), Nikkei BP. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 6 08/2009-5079 pecifications are not necessarily determined by either content providers or carriers – all parties are obliged to accept one another's technologies and services. In the Internet world, consumers choose the infrastructure they prefer. Specifications are thereby de jacto standards determined not by their technological superiority but by the fact that they are so frequently used. In the Internet worldview, Natsuno believed, carriers have to work closely with other players, including information providers, to increase the number ofusers.This ‘win-win' relationship arnong players within the network becarne the foundation of Natsuno's business model . Accordingly, DoCoMo would not purchase content from providers or equipment from manufacturers but would rather accredit â€Å"official† websites and mobile phones to be used with the new service. Interested partners would share both the risks and the rewards. Although this model restricted DoCoMo's role to simply that of a â€Å"gateway† to the Internet, as the service attracted more users, the idea went, the network would attract more content.More content would beget more users; more users would beget more content, and so on,24 thereby creating a virtuous circle where all parties benefit. Natsuno's ‘win-win' business model would also be applied to the new service's billing system. A number of the â€Å"official† sites would be subscription-only sites requiring customers to pay fees ranging from ;y;? oo to ;y;300 per month. Under Natsuno's plan, DoCoMo would collect all these fees as part ofits monthly phone bill, take a 9% commission, and then pass on t he rest to the content providers.This service would be attractive not only to content providers who could reduce their interna! cost structure, but also to users who would appreciate not having to pay several separate bills. And by giving content providers a means to charge users, i-mode would ensure that there was plenty of high quality content available. Lastly, Natsuno recommended that the new service adopt existing widely-used technologies. For exarnple, although there were better texts languages such as WML (Wireless Markup Language), DoCoMo adopted c-HTML for its new service.With this compact version of HTML, the language widely used to create websites for the PC environment, content providers could quickly, easily and at low cost modify their PC-based websites into a new version to be displayed on the new DoCoMo service. New handsets were also developed that closely resembled existing cellular phones used exclusively for voice communication. Manufacturers were asked to reduce the size and weight of the new handsets while increasing screen size, data capacity and battery power. The Launch of i-modeAlmost a year had passed since Ohboshi had taken the decision to develop the new mobile data communication service, and pressure was mounting on him to perform. Although NTT DoCoMo had managed to maintain its position as the largest mobile telecom carrier in Japan, the cost of developing the new data service was taking its toll on Ohboshi's credibility and threatening the financia! stability of the company. Colleagues peering in from outside Enoki's group were confounded by the project. â€Å"Why were we wasting our time and resources on unproven Internet phones, instead of concentrating on the still-growing, regular voice- 4Similarly, content providers were inspired to continuously update their sites in order to keep their official status. And as content providers improved their websites, users were able to receive more ‘useful' information from accessi ng the network and thus, al! three players on the network benefited. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 7 08/2009-5079 based communication services? † they wondered.By late 1998, opposition to ‘Volume to Value' was growing and Ohboshi was once again under frre. Enoki and his team finally launched the new service as ‘i-mode' on 22 February 1999- the ‘i' representing ‘interactive', ‘Internet' and the pronoun ‘I'. 25 Looking at the phones, a user would notice little difference from the latest models, except for a slightly larger liquid crystal display and the central feature: the i-mode button (Exhibit 12). This connected users to the Internet, where they could send and receive e-mail, access sport scores and weather, read the news, and download pages from the web.The new i-mode handsets were priced from ;v;35,900 to Y42,800, about 25% more than regular phones (see Exhibit 15 for comparison with other goods/services). Users were charged ;v;300 per month to access the i-mode network, and another ,y;? oo to ,y;300 to access any of the subscription-only sites. Unlike regular mobile services, users were charged by the volume of data transmitted to their mobile phones rather than the length of time on the network. For instance, it would cost ,y;Q. 3 per packet transmitted, and . 2 to send (,y;2. 1 to receive) an e ­ mail of up to 250 characters. Exhibit 13) Data transmission over mobile phones would become increasingly important for DoCoMo's bottom line: as revenue from voice calls continued to fall – from an average of $100/subscriber per month in 1997 to $65 in 2001 -data revenue amounting toan average of $17 per subscriber/month would increasingly fill the gap. 26 Initially 67 content providers participated in the new service, with sites ranging from banking to Karaoke. 27 In the days that followed, dozens of â€Å"unofficial† sites sprang up, even though they were excluded from DoCoMo's official portal.Aventure company developed a search engine for unofficial sites just 11 days after the launch of the new service as their number reached 190 (twice as many as i-mode official sites) within two months. (Exhibit 14)28 i-mode was aggressively promoted through DoCoMo's nationwide network of shops. A how ­ to book on i-mode was also published, followed by over 100 books and magazines within a year. 29 The number of subscribers exploded reaching Natsuno's â€Å"critica! mass† of 1 million users by August 1999 (Exhibit 16). 0 By March 2001, i-mode subscribers reached 21. 7 million (Exhibit 17), and revenues from packet transmission services increased from ,y;295 million to ;v;38. 5 billion within ayear after launch (Exhibit 18). 31 i-mode also contributed to an increase in revenue from regular voice services, even as price competition drove down 25 Natsuno (2000). 26 ‘Peering around the comer', The Economist, 11 October 2001. 27 ‘Mobile intemet saizensen (Frontiers of mobile i ntemet)' in Shukan Diamond, 18 March 2000. 28 Natsuno (2000). 29 lbid. 30 lbid. 1 According to one senior official at NTI DoCoMo, ‘i-mode surprisingly attracted not only young customers who were generally fond of new technologies, but also old customers who used it as a tool to communicate more often with their grandchildren. In March 2001, 27% ofthe total i-mode users were above the age of 40, compared to 20. 3% for PC-based Internet (Exhibit 21). Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 8 08/2009-5079 average monthly revenue per subscriber to V! ,770 in March 2001. 32 In addition, the important customer churn rate began to drop from 1. 97 in FY1998 to 1. 39 in FY2001, while DoCoMo's market share in the cellular market climbed to 59. 1% in March 200l. (Exhibits 5 and 18) Playing Catch-up Two months after i-mode's extraordinary launch, two competitors, DDI Cellular and IDO, announced their own mobile data communication services, called ‘EZ Web' and ‘EZ Access' respectively. Similar to i-mode, customers could subscribe to their services to access the Internet via their mobile phones. 3 However, with an eye towards future markets abroad, DDI and IDO asked their content providers to code their pages in HDML (Handheld Device Markup Language) used for the Wireless Access Protocol (WAP)34. Unsurprisingly, due to the costs and difficulties in transforming existing HTML-based Internet websites to EZ Web sites based on HDML, only a handful of content providers were willing to participate in the new service, driving DDI Cellular and IDO to purchase content until the number of subscribers was high enough for content providers to bear such costs voluntarily.In 2000, the two carriers merged to create ‘AU (access to you)'. Although the number of DDI and IDO subscribers was much smaller than DoCoMo's i-mode subscribers, they still remained competitive with 6. 7 million subscribers in 2001. (Exhibit 17) DoCoMo's other main rival, J-Phone responded to i-mode's su ccess by concentrating on improving transmission quality and adding content to its existing service (J-Sky Web), and upgrading its J-Sky service so that users could send and receive large e-mail messages (3,000 characters each) and view Internet content. 5 As with i-mode and EZ Web, all official J ­ Phone sites were accessible via the J-Phone portal and classified into nine categories. 36 By 32 This increase in revenue was due to the fact that ‘subscribers were using i-mode and voice-based communication services together, as they made phone calls after they searched restaurants and hotels on i ­ mode (‘lnterview: Keiji Tachikawa' in Shukan Diamond, 18 March 2000). 33 In addition to Internet access, the new EZ Web service offered subscribers e-mail services. They cou1d now send e-mails ofup to 250 characters and receive e-mails ofup to 2,000 characters on their cellu1ar phones.Furthermore, DDI Cellular and IDO offered PIM (Personal Information Management) services tha t were not offered by their competitors. By paying a 100 premium for address, schedule and task list functions, EZ Web subscribers were able to use their cellular phones more like PDAs (Personal Digital Assistants). DDI Cellu1ar and IDO initially offered these new EZ Web services by using circuit 1ine switching technology that was also used for their voice-based telecom services. None of them had yet a packet ­ switching network.Thus, unlike i-mode, they charged EZ Web subscribers for the connecting time rather than for the volume of data transrnitted to cellular phones (Exhibit 19). 34 DDI and IDO also asked a number oftheir content providers to connect directly to DDI Cellular and IDO's EZ Web servers, in order to secure confidentia1ity and stable transrnissions. 35 The amount of viewable content was also increased by allowing access not only to its own ‘official sites,' but also to HTML-based Internet sites and even to c-HTML-based i-mode sites by introducing MML (Mobile Markup Language) as the 1anguage for content.MML was another simplified version of HTML developed for simple mobile computing devices by J-Phone and Keio University in Tokyo. Although it was not accepted intemationally like c-HTML or HDML, it was very similar to HTML and made it easy for content providers to adapt their existing Internet websites, or even their i-mode sites, into MML-based J ­ Sky websites. 36 In a strategy to attract younger customers, J-Phone's content focuses on entertainment. ‘Keitai Denwa, PHS Kanzen Test (Cellular phones, PHS: Perfect test)', Nikkei Trendy, September 2000.Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 9 08/2009-5079 INSEAD Blue Ocean Strategy Institute 2001, the new J-Sky service continued to attract many new – particularly adolescent – customers, totaling 6. 2 million subscribers in March 2001. {Exhibit 17) Without a Net As its competitors played catch-up, DoCoMo continued to power ahead in its quest for i ­ mode dominance in Japan. I n March 1999, a month after the launch of i-mode, it formed a strategic alliance with Sun Microsystems.Through the partnership, Sun and DoCoMo developed i-appli, a new i-mode application platform that allowed users to run a wider variety of programs, from video games to online fmancial services on their mobile phones. 37 A similar strategic partnership with Symbian, a UK-based wireless operating system company, led to the development of a new operating system adaptable to both PCs and mobile phones. On the content side, in the two years after launching i-mode, DoCoMo struck a number of partnerships with new content providers, ranging from Japan Net Bank (the frrst Internet bank in Japan) and Playstation. om, to AOL and Walt Disney. Furthermore, i-mode pioneered so ­ called machine-to-machine or M2M communications that allow i-mode users to purchase soft drinks and other sundries from Japan's huge network of vending machines. A joint venture with Dentsu, the largest advertising age ncy in Japan, led to the introduction of advertisements on i-mode, thereby providing a new source of revenue and attracting new content providers to the network. Through these and other partnerships the i-mode network swelled to 42,720 sites (1,620 official and 41,100 unofficial) by March 2001.Looking into the near future, DoCoMo had great hopes for entering the European and American markets and establishing i-mode as a global standard. In recent years, the Japanese mobile giant had been building its equity stakes in various foreign carriers (Exhibit 20), as well as applying for 3G licenses in markets inside and outside of Japan. In January 2001, while NTT DoCoMo was announcing plans to introduce i-mode in Europe38 a number of crucial questions needed answers. Were i-mode and its success easily transferable outside of Japan? Could DoCoMo make it work outside of Japan and should it use the same strategy?Despite i-mode's runaway success, DoCoMo faced a number ofkey domestic challenges . Its capital expenditures continued to soar as it built its new 3G services. Network congestion and interoperability between newer mobiles and the i-mode system continued to plague the company. In March 2001, under intense political pressure, DoCoMo was forced to reduce interconnection fees to other mobile phone operators. And with Vodafone's acquisition of a controlling stake in J-Phone, DoCoMo's guaranteed preeminence in the Japanese market carne under an increasingly dark cloud.How sustainable was NTT DoCoMo's advantage and what should its future moves be? Keiji Tachikawa, Ohboshi's successor, believed that NTT DoCoMo's future was bright. In the three years since the launch of i-mode, DoCoMo had become the only company to make money out of the mobile Internet. Its net income continued to rise to an all-time high of :Y:365. 5 billion in March 2001, and its market capitalization far exceeded its parent company, 37i-appli is based on Sun's popular, highly compatible Java prograrnmi ng language. Java allows application sharing across operating systems (e. . , between Microsoft Windows and Macintosh). 38 These initiatives are in partnership with KPN Mobile and Telecom Italia Mobile (TIM). Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 10 08/2009-5079 NTT. In the fall of 2001, DoCoMo launched FOMA (â€Å"freedom of multimedia access†), the world's first 3G mobile network capable of video-telephony and the use of data and voice services simultaneously) while other promised 3G initiatives around the world languished.As Tachikawa said, â€Å"Anything mobile in society is a business opportunity for NTT DoCoMo†. 39 Maybe Mr. Ohboshi can finally get a good night's sleep. 39 ‘Interview: Keiji Tachikawa' in Shukan Diamond, 21 April2001. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC 11 08/2009-5079 Exhihit 1 Number of Regular Mobile Phone/PHS Subscribers in ]apan (in million) Mar- Mar- Mar- Mar-Mar-Mar- Mar-Mar-Mar-Jan-99 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 Mobile phones0. 49 0. 87 1. 38 1 . 172. 13 4. 33 10. 20 20. 88 31. 53 39. 9 PHS 1. 51 6. 03 6. 73 5. 86 Total 0. 49 0. 87 1. 38 1. 712. 134. 33 11. 71 26. 9138. 25 45. 64 (Reference) Pagers4. 25 5. 08 5. 916. 69 8. 06 9. 35 10. 6110. 07 7. 12 4. 27 Fixed-line-54. 48 56. 2157. 60 58. 7859. 8861. 04 61. 46 60. 38 NIA Source: Ministry ofPublic Management, Home Affairs, Post and Telecommunications (MPHPT), Telecommunication Carriers Association (TCA), Statistics Bureau and Statistics Centre. Exhihit 2 Development of Regular Mobile Phones in ]apan Year Height Width Thickness Weight Battery Life 1979| 140| 50| 210| 2,400| NIA| 1985| 190| 55| 220| 3,000| 8| 987| 120| 42| 180| 900| 6| 1989| 175| 42| 77| 640| 9| 1991| 140| 47| 26| 220| 13| 1994| 143| 49| 29| 185| 20| 1995| 140| 42| 26| 155| 150| 1996| 130| 41| 23| 94| 170| 1997| 127| 40| 18| 79| 220| 1979| 140| 50| 210| 2,400| NIA| 1985| 190| 55| 220| 3,000| 8| 1987| 120| 42| 180| 900| 6| 1989| 175| 42| 77| 640| 9| 1991| 140| 47| 26| 220| 13| 1994| 143| 49| 29| 185| 20| 199 5| 140| 42| 26| 155| 150| 1996| 130| 41| 23| 94| 170| 1997| 127| 40| 18| 79| 220| {mm} {mm} {mm} {g} (hours} 1998 123 39 17 68 330 Source:NTT DoCoMo, Panasonic. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC12 08/2009-5079 Mobile Phone Rates en 200,000 180,000 160,000 140,000 120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. .. †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. _ †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. -Deposit — Subscription fee – – – – – –  · Monthly basic charge (analogue) –Monthly basic charge (digital) r—â€Å"‘ ;;::-g, â€Å"‘ r—â€Å"‘ ;;::-g, â€Å"‘ o. _†¦.. O oN †¦. â€Å"Mo. Copyright © 2003lNSEAD-EAC Digital MOVA N503i HYPER (i-appli) (March 2001) Price: Open Weight: 98g Size: N/A Battery life: 460 hours -mode Packet Transmission Charges 18 Digital MOVA D503iS HYPER (i-appli) (September 2001) Price: Open Weight: 105g Size: N/A Battery life: 450 hours 08/2009-5079 Mymenu MenuList Mobile banking (balance information) Mobile banking (funds transfer) News Airline seat availability Restaurant guide TOWNPAGE (NTT telephone directory) Share prices (searching by issue code) Image download (downloading one still image the size ofthe display) i-melody (downloading one 3-chord melody approx. 15 seconds in length) Char es 2-3 3-4 20-21 59-60 17-18 24-25 37-38 35-36 26-27 7-8 2-3 -anime (downloading one moving image the size ofthe display) 10-11 i-mode mail transrnission charges| Sending| Receiving| 20 Full-size characters| 0. 9| 0. 9| 50 Full-size characters| 1. 5| 0. 9| 100 Full-size characters| 2. 1| 1. 2| 150 Full-size characters| 3. 0| 1. 5| 250 Full-size characters 4. 2 2. 1 Source:NTT DoCoMo. Exhihit 14 The Number of i-mode Compatible Sites 30000 c:::JNumber ofi-mode Wlofficial sites 60% 25 000 20000 15 000 10000 5 000 —+-% oftota l access 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% mars-99sept-99mars-00 Note: Number of sites in March 1999 is the number on 5 April 1999.Source: Natsuno (2000), p. 187. 0% sept-00 Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC19 08/2009-5079 —-.. –Blue Ocean Strategy Institute Exhihit 15 Retail Price per Unit and Market Size for Various Goods/Services (in FY 1999) ItemsAverage retail price (Yen) Weekly magazine300 Monthly magazine550-540 Newspapers (monthly)3,925-4,384 TV set97,130 Radio tape recorder19,680 Mobile computer games (Gameboy)8,900 Computer game software (Gameboy)3,000-4,900 Home PC207,000-227,000 Telephone (fixed-Jine)21,270 i-mode handsets35,900-42,800 Mobile phones (voice only)28,200-42,800 PHS handsets16,700-30,100Market size (thousands) 138,480 214,630 72,218 434,171 24,233 23,970 NIA 14,311 58,470 _R gJ 9_Q-_l ,? 9_Q _? ?_6_ . TV Jicense fees (month1y)1,345 Internet connection charges (month1y: fixed)8,050 2. 7 Yen per 1 min. Telephone bill (fixed line: monthly) Telephone bill (mobile: m onthly) Telephone bill (PHS: monthly) 8,198 10 Yen per 3 min. 9,270 45-120 yen per 3 min. 5,550 30-130 Yen per 3 min. Pager bill (monthly) 2,697 Note: – Telephone bilis are estimated from ARPU or Operating revenues. – Market size ofTV, Radio tape recorder and Home PC are estimated from their penetration rates. Market size of Gameboy is estimated from its outstanding units sold. Source: MPHPT, NTT DoCoMo, NTT, TCA, Dentsu Institute for Human Studies. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC20 08/2009-5079 i-mode Monthly Subscriber Trend 25,000 70% Number of i-mode 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 subscribers (thousands) % of total subscribers 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% oilDllilhUWWllil WWWUUhllllilUL0% 0'1 0'1 0'1 0'1 0'1 0'1 o o o o o o †¦.. 1 1 1 1 1  § 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  § 1 1 0'1 0'1 0'1 0'1 0'1 0'1 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 13 †¦.. ()..!. () 13Source: NTT DoCoMo, TCA. ()Q) ()Q) †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. Exhihit 17 Number of Subscribers for Mobile Data Services on Cellular Phones t housands 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 –i-mode – — EZWeb –J-Sky 15,000 10,000 5,000 0+–+—4–+–+—4–4–+- 910, 910, 910, 910, 910, r;::,r::::. r;::,r::::. r;::,r::::. r;::,r::::. r;::,r::::. r;::,r::::. r;::,'. r;::,'. r;::,'. r;::,'. r;::,'. #;#;#; Source: TCA. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC21 08/2009-5079 Blue Ocean Strategy lnstitute Exhihit 18 NTl' DoCoMo's Financia} Performance since the Launch ofi-mode million yen} Sales revenues| Mar-99| Mar-00| Mar-01| Mar-02E| | 3,118,398| 3,718,694| 4,686,004| 5,297,000| Revenues from packet data communication| 295| 38,500| NIA| NIA| Netincome| 204,815| 252,140| 365,505| 390,000| Operating margin| 16. 3%| 14. 7%| 16. 6%| 17. 4%| Net income margin| 6. 6%| 6. 8%| 7. 8%| 7. 4%| Market capitalization——————————————————————â €”———————–| 11,203,920| 40,314,960| 20,977,333| NIA———–| Capital expenditures| 845,900| 876,058| 1,012,795| 1,070,000| R&D Expenses| 41,100| 89,100| 95,400| NIA|Average monthly churn rate| 1. 75%| 1. 61%| 1. 39%| 1. 32%| Average month1y revenue per user (ARPU: yen)| 9,270| 8,740| 8,650| 8,580| ARPU from cellular phone service (yen)| NIA| 8,620| 7,770| 7,160| ARPU from i-mode (yen)| NIA| 120| 880| 1,420| Average monthly minutes ofuse per subscriber| 164| 177| 189| 195| Number of subscribers (thousands)| 23,897| 29,356| 36,026| 40,300| Number ofi-mode subscribers (thousands)| 140| 5,603| 21,695| 29,800| Market share| 57. 5%| 57. 4%| 59. 1%| NIA| Source:NTT DoCoMo. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC2208/2009-5079Mobile Data Communication Services on Mobile Phones (as of Sept. 2000) | NTT DoCoMo| DDI Cellular(au)| IDO (au)| Tu-Ka| J-Phone| Service| i-mode| EZWeb| EZAccess| EZWeb| J-Sky| Functions|  œ Internet access- Internet mail transmission| – Internet access- Internet mail transmission- PIM services| – Internet access- Internet mail transmission- PIM services| – Internet access- Internet mail transmission- PIM services| – Internet access(J-Sky Web)- Internet mail transmission (J- Sky Walker)| NetworkPlatforms| PDC (800MHz)| cdmaOne(800 MHz)| cdmaOne(800MHz)| PDC (1. GHz)| PDC (1. 5 GHz)| CommunicationMethod(Speed)| Packet switching technology (9600 bps)| Circuit switching technology (14. 4 kbps)| Circuit switching technology (14. 4 kbps)| Circuit switching technology (9600 bps)| Circuit switching technology (9600 bps)| | | Packet switching technology (14. 4 kbps)| Packet switching technology (14. kbps)| | | Content| c-HTML| HDML (WAPbased)| HDML (WAPbased)| HDML (WAP based)| MML| Content Providers| Official: 1,000Unofficial: 24,032| Official: 368Unofficial: 1,600| Official: 258Unofficial: 2,700| E-mail size| Sendlreceive: 250 full characters| Se nd: 250 full charactersReceive: 2,000 full characters| Sendlreceive:3,000 characters| Fee CollectionServices| February 1999| March2000| July 2000| June 2000| April2000| Monthly Basic Charge (yen)| 300| Standard: 300Premium: 400| Standard: 200Premium: 400| Standard: 200Premium: 300| J-Sky Web: No chargeJ-Sky Walker:250| AccessFees| 0. 3 yenper 1 packet (= 128 bytes)| First 15 seconds free and 1O yen per 30 seconds thereafter| 1O yen per minute| First minute 3 yen and 10 yen per minute thereafter| J-Sky Web: 2 yen per single request1 replyJ-Sky Walker: 8 yen per message transmission| | | Packet comm. :0. 27 yen per 1 packet (= 128 bytes)| Packet comm. :0. 7 yen per 1 packet (= 128 bytes)| | | Handset (Nominal 1 Real retail prices: yen)| NECN502i(39,0001 18,800)Mitsubishi D209i(34,600 1 16,800)| Panasonic C308P (44,300 1 1,800)Sony C305S (45,8001 1,800)| Sharp J-SH03 (42,000 1 9,800)Toshiba J-T04 (42,000 1 7,800)| Panasonic TPOl(Open 1 4,800)Toshiba TI02 (Open 1 4,800)| Subscribers {_% ofmarket)| 12. 6 million(64. 2%)| 3. 9 million(16. 5%)| 0. 7 million(3. 3%)| 3. 1 million(16. 0%)| Service start| February 1999| Aprill999| November 1999| December 1999| Source: NTT DoCoMo, KDDI, MSDW, CSFB, TC. A, ‘Nikkei Trendy'Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC23 08/2009-5079 Blue Ocean Strategy Institute Exhibit 20 NTI' DoCoMo's Major Overseas Operations since 1999 2 March 1999 Joint test of 30 mobile communications system with Telephone Organization of Thailand and NEC 17 March 1999 Establishment of local corporation in Brazil 30 September 1999 Establishment ofUS subsidiaries 8 October 1999 Establishment of Joint Initiative toward Mobile Multimedia (JIMM) with 8 forei calliers 2 December 1999 Capital investment in Hutchison Whampoa (Hong Kong) 27 January 2000 W-CDMA field trials in South Korea with SK Telecom May2000Equity participation in KPN Mobile (the Netherlands) 27 June 2000 Establishment ofrepresentative office in Bemng, China 12 July 2000 Announcement of 30 mobile mul timedia strategic cooperation with Hutchison Whampoa and KPN Mobile 2 August 2000 Launch of Japan-South Korea roaming service with SK Telecom 29 S tember 2000 Establishment ofUK subsidiary and research lab in Oermany 30 November 2000 Capital investment in KG Telecomj_Taiwall}_ 30 November 2000 Capital investment in AT;T Wireless (US) 7 December 2000 Establishment ofadvisory board in US 8 January 2001 Announcement ofPan-European mobile Internet alliance with KPN Mobile and TIM Jltalyl 22 January 2001 Launch ofinternational roaming service in Europe, Asia Africa and Oceania 7 Novernber 2001 Agreernent with KPN Mobile to transfer and license technologies for i-mode-like services in Europe 18 February 2002 Agreement with E-Plus (Oermany) to transfer and license technologies for i-mode- like services in Europe (service launched on 16 March 2002) 1 March2002Listing ofstocks on London and New York Stock ExchangesNote: The dates shown above are the dates ofPress Releases from NTT DoCoMo (as ofMarch 2002). Source:NTT DoCoMo. (Other major partnerships to promote mobile multimedia servtces) 15 March 1999| Increased leve! ofrelationshiPs, S! mbian (UK)| 16 March 1999| Technological partnership, Sun Microsystems (US)| 17 March 1999| Fusion oftechnologies, increased leve! ofcooperation, Microsoft (US)| 14 June 2000| Increased level of relationships, 3Com {US)| 27 September 2000| Joint development of new Internet services, American Online (US)|Note: The dates shown above are the dates ofPress Releases from NTT DoCoMo (as ofSept. 2000). Source:NTT DoCoMo. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC2408/2009-5079 Exhibit 21 Comparison between i-mode and the Internet | i-mode| Internet| Sex ofusers(Male: Female)| 57:43| 58:42| Age ofusers| Under 19:7%20-24:24%25-29:20%30-34: 12%35-39:8% Above 40: 27% Unknown:2%| Under 19: 2. 6%20-29:38. 1%30-39:38. 1%40-49: 15. 6% Above 50:4. 7% Unknown: 0. 9%| Price| Monthly basic charge of 300 yen+0. yen per 1 packet| Monthly basic charge of 1,480 yen + 8 yen per 3 minutes| Number ofusers(March 2001)| 21. 70 million| 17. 25 million| Note: – Prices exclude monthly basic charges for cellular phone and fixed line telecom services. Price for the Internet is based on KDDI's IP service rates. – Number of users for the Internet is the number of contracts with Internet providers excluding mobile telecom carriers. Source:MPT, NTT DoCoMo, KDDI. Copyright © 2003 INSEAD-EAC2508/2009-5079

Dangers of Hidden Sin essays

Dangers of Hidden Sin essays Sin is something society has had to deal with since mankind has known evil. In most circumstances, the sin only becomes a problem when it is kept within and manifests into something larger than it was in the first place. Keeping secrets is a detriment to ones life, which in a larger picture affects a whole society. In The Scarlet Letter, by Nathaniel Hawthorne, secret sin is a predominant theme, which in this novel leads to changes in both emotional and physical being. In the early days of the Massachusetts colony, they are neither welcoming nor accepting of sin or different ideas and are wary of anything that may topple their pristine atmosphere. Evil should never be kept secret because it always leaves a mark. Hester Prynne hides a significant amount of sin inside of herself, which only adds to sins that have been made an issue of public interest. Committing adultery is Hesters announced sin, and all her secret sins are results of this one instance. A sin, which is closely related to her sin of adultery, is who the father of Pearl is. She refuses to tell even under extreme pressure, I will not speak! And my child must seek a heavenly Father; she shall never know an earthly one (47). We later learn that the father is Arthur Dimmesdale, and these miscommunications cause a barrier between them. Her refusal consequently denies any hope of reconciliation between the two for an extensive period. Hester also conceals that Roger Chillingworth is her husband. This pains her because she must helplessly watch his evil ways take toll on Dimmesdale. However, Chillingworths punishment of Dimmesdale goes against he and Hesters agreement. Hester promised to keep both Chillingworth and Dimmesdales identi ties hidden or Chillingworth would seek out Hesters secret lover, Dimmesdale, and kill him. Hester causes the townspeople to become forgiving people by her many good deeds; this changes the A&...

Four Kinds of Morpheme

Four Kinds of Morpheme Four Kinds of Morpheme Four Kinds of Morpheme By Maeve Maddox A useful definition of morphemegood enough for most purposesis â€Å"a minimal and indivisible morphological unit that cannot be analyzed into smaller units.† This broad definition is adequate for most general discussions, but it’s possible to get more specific. Just for fun, here are four different kinds of morpheme. allomorph or morph: any part of a word we want to talk about. A morph can be a whole word, like dog, a meaningful affix, like un- or -ness, or a part that has no meaning, but is separable, like the o in kissogram (a telegram delivered with a kiss, intended to amuse or embarrass the recipient.) portmanteau morph: a single form which consists of two or more morphemes, but which cannot be divided neatly. For example, the verb crashed can be separated into the morphemes crash and -ed, but a word like sang, which consists of the stem sing and a past tense marker (the changed vowel), cannot be so divided. empty morph: a piece of a word that does not contribute to its meaning, but is necessary to make it easily pronounceable. For example, the o in kissogram. (Linguists argue about something called a â€Å"null morpheme,† but as I’m not writing for linguists, I won’t go there.) cranberry morpheme: a morpheme that occurs in only one word, like the cran in cranberry, the twi in twilight, and the -art in braggart. Note on cran-, twi-, and -art: cran- The Cape Cod Cranberry Growers’ Association explains the cran in cranberry this way: The name cranberry derives from the Pilgrim name for the fruit, craneberry, so called because the small, pink blossoms that appear in the spring resemble the head and bill of a Sandhill crane. The OED entry tells us that the word cranberry was unknown to herbalists writing in the 16th and 17th centuries. They knew about cranberries, but they called them other names, such as marsh-whorts and fen-berries. The North American cranberry growers may have adopted the name from German immigrants. Low German has the forms krà ´nbere, krones- or kronsbere, krà ´nsbr, kranebere; all translate as â€Å"crane-berry.† British speakers adopted the word cranberry in the 18th century. twi- This allomorph may also derive from German. Both High German and Low German have words that mean what twilight does. Middle High German has zwischenliecht, â€Å"tweenlight†; Low German has twà ªdustern, twà ªdunkern, literally â€Å"twi-dark.† -art This affix belongs to class of suffixes that turn a verb into a noun doer of the action. The spelling s of words in which –ard conveys the discreditable connotation include drunkard, laggard, and sluggard. Braggart is the only -art survivor in common use. Want to improve your English in five minutes a day? Get a subscription and start receiving our writing tips and exercises daily! Keep learning! Browse the Grammar 101 category, check our popular posts, or choose a related post below:Arrive To vs. Arrive AtWhenever vs. When EverEpidemic vs. Pandemic vs. Endemic

Opportunities and challenges faced by multi-national companies in Essay - 1

Opportunities and challenges faced by multi-national companies in setting an appropriate transfer price - Essay Example This strategy creates both the opportunities and challenges to the multinational companies. One of the major challenge that face multinational companies is complying with transfer pricing rules which is a costly affair itself. However, when times are tough, tax laws are adjusted, an aspect that increases the cost of compliance. With every change in the tax laws, the multinational companies had to interpret the law, apply it effectively and change their internal systems (Kuan,  WorldTrade Executive (Concord, & Mass.) 2005). For instance, they have to automate the processes and hire tax professionals who will track these changes on a regular basis. This requires immense spending by these firms. Managing and producing a detailed trail of audit which involve a step by step of the overall process of transfer pricing is demanding and time-consuming (Wintzer 2007). Therefore, many companies that lack effective internal strategies find it difficult to take up this process. In addition, these companies face a challenge of using a third party because they lack an in-depth understanding of their businesses and operations. In some cases, the top officials use this opportunity to embezzle funds from the organization, thereby affecting their positions in the market. Transfer pricing provides an opportunity for the multinational companies to exercise their â€Å"multinationality† (Bakker & Obuoforibo 2009). In case these transfers do not exist, the concept of multinational companies to exist in different markets would not apply at all. Instead, domestic businesses would dominate each local market in the country. Therefore, transfer pricing plays a significant role in enabling these firms to transfer their resources to other countries some of which are used to support struggling subsidiaries which are located in countries experiencing intense